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ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a property tax case. The property concemed is owned by a utility company
(PacifiCorp) operating in several westem states.

It is assessed by the Idaho State Tax

Commission (Commission). Idaho property taxes for such a company are calculated by first
determining the system, or unit, value. This is the total taxable value of the company's operating
property. The next step determines what portion of this total value should be allocated to Idaho.
The Idaho value is then apportioned to the various Idaho taxing districts in which PacifiCorp's
property lies. The dispute in this case concerns the system value of the property.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Commission staff valued PacifiCorp's property for the 2008 tax year.

PacifiCorp

disagreed with the valuation and timely sought review by the State Board of Equalization
(Board). The Board issued its decision lowering the value of the property. PacifiCorp timely
filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the district court. The district court held a trial de 1l0VO
resulting in the decision from which the Commission appeals.

ST ATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

Glossary
Cost approach

one of the three indicators of value considered in arriving at an estimate

of market value. There are various cost approaches. The appraisals in this case usc historical
cost less depreciation (HCLD).
Income approach - another of the three indicators of value considered in arriving at an
estimate of market value. There arc a number of income approaches.
APPELLATE BRIEF - I

Market approach

the third of the indicators of value considered in arriving at an

estimate of market value. The classic market approach is to use sales of comparable properties
to estimate the value of the property being appraised. When there are too few sales for this to be
viable, a different technique known as 'stock and debt' is sometimes used.
Functional obsolescence - obsolescence attributable to deficiencies (or superadequacies)
in the propeliy being assessed.
Economic, or external, obsolescence - obsolescence attributable to influences outside the
property being appraised.
[ncome shortfall - also known as capitalization of income loss,

IS

a method used to

measure functional and external obsolescence.
Deferred income tax - these arise when (I) customers pay rates set assuming income tax
liabilities will be calculated using straight line depreciation (for example, 5 percent per year for
20 years) but (2) tax liabilities are actually paid llsing accelerated depreciation. This provides the
company with the benefit of higher early cash flows.

(Johnson, Testimony of July 16, 2010

(afternoon), pp 29-30.)

2.
Facts
PacifiCorp is an electric utility operating in several western states. fn Marcb of 2006,
PaciftCorp's then owner, Scottish Power, sold PacifiCorp to MiclAmerican Energy Holdings, a
company wholly-owned by Berkshire Hathmvay. The sales price was $9.2 billion, with 55.1
billion being cash and the remainder the assumption of debt and preferred stock.
Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal, p. \5.)

(Petitioner

[Note the Montana State Tax Appeals Board put the

sale price at $9.4 billion. Paci/iCO/l) v. Department of Revenue, Stab No. CT 2006-5, CT 2007-
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7, p. 14 (2011 WL 130102, Mont Tax Appeal Bd, 2011.)]

After the purchase, MidAmerica

Energy made Securities and Exchange Commission filings indicating the value of PacifiCorp's
property, plant, and equipment, taking depreciation into account, was $10 billion. (Rudd,
Testimony of July 14, 2010, pp. 122-23.) In addition, from 2006 to 2008 PacifiCorp added
approximately $2 billion in additional plant. (Rudd, Testimony of July 14,2010, pp 123-24.)
The Commission's expert, Mr.

Eyre,

valued the property at $11,007,000,000.

(Respondent Exhibit 515, Review Appraisal of Eyre, p. 64 of 92.) The Commission's appraiser,
Mr. Rudd, valued PacifiCorp's property at $9,273,982,721.
Appraisal, p. 2.)

(Petitioner Exhibit 4, Rudd

The decision of the Commission valued the property at $8,877,075,014.

(Petitioner Exhibit 6, Decision, p. 6.) PacifiCorp's expert, Mr. Tegarden, valued the property at
$8,350,000,000. (Petitioner Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal, p. 105.)
rn the cost approach to value, Messrs Rudd, Eyre, and Tegarden substantially agree with
one another to a point. Each appraisal uses HCLD in the cost approach. Eaeh appraisal starts
with very similar historical cost.

Each appraisal then subtracts depreciation obtained from

information PacifiCorp provided the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission on FERC Form 1.
(Tegarden, Testimony of July 12, 20 I 0, pp 218-221; Eyre, Testimony of July 15, 2010, pp 308309)

Unlike the other appraisals, the PacifiCorp appraisal goes on to subtract additional

depreciation in the form of functional and economic obsolescence. PacifiCorp measures these
two forms of obsolescence in the same way. (Tegarden, Testimony of July 14, 2010, p. 100,
lines 4 - 9.) Mr. Tegarden calculates obsolescence as follows. He uses his "investor required
rate of return" of 9.10 percent developed in his income approach and compares it to his lower
expected rate of return of 7.20 percent. The lower rate of return is divided by the higher rate of
return to yield 79.12 percent. Subtract this from 100 percent and the result is 20.88 percent.
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This is the percentage of obsolescence Mr. Tegarden uses to attain his final cost approach value.
(Petitioner Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal, p. 27.)
Additional facts will be cited when noted in the argument. I

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
May PacifiCorp deduct obsolescence from the cost approach to value without offering
evidence of the cause of the obsolescence, the quantity of the obsolesccnce, and that the asserted
obsolescence actually affects the property?

ARGUMENT
The Commission will argue that PacifiCorp's appraisal

IS

unreliable because it uses

questionable techniques and impermissible assumptions to reach an untenable result. Although
the Commission believes PacifiCorp's income approach is flawed, too, it will concentrate on the
cost approach.

The Commission will argue that the cost approach PacifiCorp used in its

appraisal should be disallowed because it merely assumes obsolescence, a form of depreciation.

It will show how obsolescence and its etTects can reliably be determined.

A.
PacifiCorp's Appraisal is Unreliable
The following demonstrate several reasons PacifiCorp's appraisal is unreliable.
(I)
Because PacitiCorp's self. . reported depreciation already includes obsolescence,
it is improper t<Jr PacifiCorp to attempt to subtract it again

I There is the possibility of confusion in the record. The testimony of the fourth day of trial, July 16,2010. is fOllnd
in two binders. the second of which covers much of the testimony taken in the afternoon. When cited in this brief
the atternoon testimony will be noted as sllch. When identifying exhibits. "Petitioner" is PacifiCorp. the Petitioner
below; "Respondent'" is the Commission.
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The Commission's appraiser (Rudd), the Commission's expert (Eyre), and PacifiCorp's
expert (Tegarden) all use original cost information reported to FERC by PacifiCorp. They each
subtract depreciation, also reported to FERC by PacifiCorp. Mr. Tegarden goes on to subtract
additional depreciation in the form of obsolescence on the theory it was not captured in the
depreciation PacifiCorp reported to FERC. (Petitioner Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal, p. 27.)
Obsolescence, however, is already captured in the PacifiCorp FERC filing.
Title 18, part 10 1 of the Code of Federal Regulations prescribes a system of accounts for
public utilities and licensees under the Federal Power Act. It defines depreciation. In pertinent
part, that definition states that, as applied to depreciable electric plant, "Among the causes to be
given consideration are wear and tear, decay, action of the elements, inadequacy, obsolescence,
changes in the art, changes in demand and requirements of public authorities. [18 CFR part
101, definition 12. Emphasis added.)] PacifiCorp's self-reported depreciation was supposed to
include obsolescence.

PacifiCorp either filed falsely with FERC or Mr. Tegarden seeks to

subtract obsolescence twice.

(2)
It follows from the assumptions in PacifiCorp's appraisal

that the company will always lose money
PacifiCorp's own witnesses provide a conclusive reason its appraisal is unreliable. Based
on the assumption that nct operating income (NOI) is the only benefit in owning PacitiCorp, they
assert that PacifiCorp loses money and will always lose money.
Mr. Tegarden's testimony includes a revealing comment in his analysis of the difference
between real growth and nominal growth.

Q. (1' you wouldn't mind explaining the difference between real growth
and nominal growth, if you could?

APPELLATE BRIEF - 5

A. Okay. Let's say we invest $1,000 at the beginning of the year into a
group of assets, and use figures that we're fairly familiar with in this case. We
found in our cost approach that this group of assets of PacifiCorp was earning
approximately 7.2 percent rate of return. If we invest $1000 and earn a rate of
return of 7.2 percent, at the end of the year, our assets will have grown to $1,072.

But your cost of capital, as I found in my appraisal, was 9.1 percent. If
you discount the present worth of that, that means the present worth of the right to
receive the $1,072 is about 983 dollars today. So what you have is growth that's
nominal growth, but you have no real growth. In fact, you've lost $17 of
purchasing power.

You could take, then, the 900 million dollars that PacitiCorp has in their
construction work in progress account and say, well, we're earning about 7.2
percent. That's what we've been earning in the past. It looks like we could do
that. So we could put 900 million and grow that at 7.2 percent for one year. And
we would have 965 million.
So sure, you have the illusion of growth, but again, doing that same type
of calculation .... Let's discount it back at 9.1, solve for present value, we get an
84. So we've lost some 16 million of purchasing power. So it looks like it's a
bad investment.
(Tegarden, Testimony of July 16, 2010, pp 80-82.)
Mr. Tegarden, in short, asserts that his appraisal shows PacifiCorp currently losing money on
every dollar it invests.
Mr. McDougal, a company officer, asserts that PacifiCorp will always lose money on
every dollar it invests.
Q. Over the long run, do you believe that rate regulated utilities like
PacitiCorp will earn over its cost rate of capital?

A. No, I do not.
Q. Why not?

A. If you look at the whole regulatory process, once we get an item into
rate base we wi II recover our cost of capital. Because of lag when we make the
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investment and when that investment is in rate base, there's always going to be a
time period where we don't recover it.
(McDougal, Testimony of July 16,2010, 133, lines 11 - 24.)
According to their witnesses, PacifiCorp not only fails to earn over its cost of capital, it
will forever earn less than its cost of capital. As Mr. Tegarden implied, for an investment to be
worthwhile, the retum on the investment must exceed its cost of capital. Mr. McDougal asserts
that PacifiCorp will never even attain its cost of capital, let alone go over it.

PacifiCorp,

according to Messrs Tegarden and McDougal, must always operate in the red!
The obvious question, then, is why would anyone, especially Berkshire Hathaway, ever
invest in PacifiCorp? There are two possibilities. The first is that Mr. Tegarden's appraisal is
wrong because PacifiCorp does yield benefits in excess of what Mr. Tegarden assumes. The
second is that investors are incompetent.
PacifiCorp maintains it will never recover its cost of capital from rate base.

Does

ownership of PacitiCol'P provide benefits other than NOI derived from rate base? Mr. Tegarden
denies it. (Tegarden, Testimony of July 16, 20 I 0, p. 72, lines 6 - 16.) Both Dr. Johnson and
Mr. Eyre suggest deferred income tax is an additional benefit.

(Johnson, Testimony of

July 16,2010 (afternoon) pp 79-80; Eyre, Testimony of July 15,2010, p. 290, lines 16 - 24.)
Both Mr. McDougal and Mr. Tegarden dispute this. (McDougal, Testimony of July 16,2010,
p. 130 and 131; Tegarden, Testimony of July 16, 20 I0, p. 72, lines 17 - 21.) Warren Buffet does
not.
Berkshire has access to two low-cost, non-perilous sources of leverage
that allow us to sately own t~lr more assets than our equity capital alone would
permit: deterred taxes and "float," the funds of others that our insurance business
holds because it receives premiums before needing to payout losses. Both of
these funding sources have grown rapidly and now total about $68 billion.
Better yet, this funding to date has been cost-fi·ee. Deferred tax liabilities
bear no interest...Neither item, of course, is equity; these are real liabilities. But
APPELLATE BRIEF - 7

they are liabilities without covenants or due dates attached to them. In effect, they
give us the benefit of debt - an ability to have more assets working for us - but
saddle us with none of its drawbacks.

Pac(liCorp v. State o/Montana, Dept. of Revellue, Cause Nos. CT 2006-5, CT-2007-7, 2011 WL
130102 p. 34 (Mont. Tax App. Bd, 2011, quoting Warren Buffet in Berkshire Hathaway's 2008
Annual Report.)
Dr. Johnson, one of the Commission's expelis, estimates that by taking deferred income
taxes into account, PacifiCorp's real cost of capital is approximately 7°;;), not 9.1 %. (Johnson,
Testimony of July 16, 2010 (afternoon), p. 89, lines 17-25, and p. 90, line 1.)

Because

PacifiCorp's return on investment is above 7 percent, it suddenly looks like a company Warren
Buffett might choose to buy, rather than a company doomed always to lose money.
Finally, in Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes solves the case noting the dog that did not
?

bark.- There is a dog that does not bark in this case, too. A 137 -page confidential memorandum
goes into great detail concerning PacitiCorp's prospects for the years 2008 through 2017. One
might expect that if the company was doomed to lose money, word would have leaked out. Yet
on this calamity the document is silent. [Respondent's Exhibit 516, PacifiCorp 2008-2017 Ten
Year Plan (sealed).] PacitiCorp envisions making money, not losing it. Mr. Tegarden's critical
assertion that the cost of capital exceeds the return on investment must be wrong.

(3)
PacifiCorp's appraisal assigns zero valuc to property
not includcd in rate base
Regulators generally do not allow property purchased with deferred income taxes to be
included in rate base. (Petitioncr Exhibit 20, Tcgarden Appraisal, p. 30.) Mr. Tegardcn asserts
that PacifiCorp offers no bcnetits othcr than NO!. (Tegarden, Testimony of July 16,20 I 0, p. 72,
Gregory (Scotland Yard detective): "Is there any other point to which you would wish to draw my attention'!"
Holmes: "To the curioLls incident of the dog in the night-time."
Gregory: "The dog did nothing in the night-time,"
lIolmes: "That was the curious incident."
2
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lines 4-16.)

It follows that PacifiCorp's NOI is derived from property in rate base.

When

PacifiCorp's appraisal assigns value to property using only its contribution to NOI, it assigns
zero value to property not included in rate base. Is this property really worth nothing? If so,
why was it purchascd in the first placc? Imagine being shown multi-million dollar additions to
plant and equipment and then being told its value is zero. We would look askance at the speaker
to see ifhe was joking. Yct this is what PacitiCorp's appraisal asserts.
In an Oregon property tax case, the Oregon Tax Court agreed with the taxpayer that there
should be deductions from value for prope11y purchased using defcrred income tax and
investment tax credit funds. It explained these deductions on the theory that the property was not
included in rate base and, therefore, not contributing to the taxpayer's income. This is the same
theory PacifiCorp espouses here. The Oregon Supreme Court rcversed, holding that property
acquired using deferred income tax and investment tax credit funds has intrinsic value. Pacific

Power & Light Company v. Department o.lRevenue, State

(~f Oregon,

775 P. 2d 303 (at 308),

308 Or 49 (at 57-58), (S. Ct. Or. 1989).

(4)
PacifiCorp's appraisal ignores, on spurious grounds,
the sale of this property only twenty-one months
before the appraisal date
In March 2006, Scottish Powcr sold PacifiCorp to Berkshirc-Hathaway (through
MidAmcrican Holding Company.) (Petitioncr's Exhibit 20, Tcgardcn Appraisal, p. 93.) Thc
sale was for S9.2, of which S5.1 billion was cash and $4.1 billion \vas assumption of dcbt. Mr.
Tcgardcn did not usc this information in arriving at his opinion of value. "It was an invcstmcnt
value sale, in my opinion, not an indication of markct valuc." (Tcgardcn, Tcstimony of July 16,

2010, p. 99, lines 19-21.) Why was thc salc not a markct value sale? "Investment valuc is the

APPELLATE BRIEF - 9

specific value to an investor or specific group of investors as opposed to the typical investor.
The purchaser here was - I don't believe was the typical investor." (Tegarden, Testimony of
July 16, 2010, pp 99 - 100.) In fact, Mr. Tegarden believes that Berkshire-Hathaway is a unique
purchaser. "It's difficult to imagine another buyer with similar access to capital which operates
on a similarly patient and long-teml view." (Petitioner Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal, p. 94.)
In a nutshell, Mr. Tegarden considers the sale, but then ignores it on the grounds that BerkshireHathaway is a unique buyer.
This analysis ignores Idaho's statutory definition of market value.

That definition

essentially requires an arm's-length transaction between a willing, infOlmed buyer and a willing
seller, under no compunction to sell. [Idaho Code § 63-20 I (15)].

That is what we have in the

sale of the company from Scottish Power to Berkshire-Hathaway. Pac[jiCorp v. Department of

Revenue, Stab No. CT 2006-5, CT 2007-7, p. 142011 WL 130102, (Mont Tax Appeal Bd, 2011,
noting testimony of PacitiCorp's CFO.) If Mr. Tegarden wishes to disregard the sale of the
property that meets the statutory definition of a market sale, he cannot do so by asserting it is not
a market sale.
Mr. Tegarden made the same "investment value" argument for the same sale before the
Montana Board of Tax Appeals.

It was rejected. Pac[jiCo'7) v. State of Montana, Dept.

(~l

Revenue, Cause Nos. CT 2006-5, CT-2007-7, 20 II WL 130 I02 p. 22-23 (Mont. Tax App. Bd,
20 II)

APPELLATE BRIEF - 10

(5)
PacifiCorp's appraisal surreptitiously and
dramatically changes the weighting of the income approach
and cost approaches when determining the final value
In order to lower the final appraised value, PacifiCorp must diminish the importance of
the cost indicator of value. It does this in two ways. First, it assigns little weight to the cost
indicator. That is the subject of this section. Second, it adjusts the cost indicator downward to
be closer to the income indicator. That is the subject of the following section.
All three approaches to value (market approach, cost approach and income approach)
should be considered, if not used, when determining value. (lDAPA 35.01.03.217.02.) In this
case, both the Commission's appraiser and PacifiCorp's appraiser determined that the market
approach was not useful due to a lack of available data. (Petitioner's Exhibit 20, Tegarden
Appraisal, p. 104; Petitioner's Exhibit 4, Rudd Appraisal, p. 5.)] (Mr. Eyre did develop a market
approach as he had more information by the time he issued his report.) The income approach
and cost approach were used to develop a final value.

In developing this final value, the

Commission's appraiser relied on the cost approach for 45 percent and the income approach
for 55 percent. This is stated clearly in the Commission's appraisal report. (Petitioner's Exhibit

4, Rudd Appraisal, p. 6.) The Commission's expert, Mr. Eyre, also clearly indicates the weight
he gave the various approaches he developed. (Respondent Exhibit 515, Review Appraisal of
Eyre, p. 62-63 of 92.)
Paci tiCorp 's appraisal does not state the weight given each appraisal. Paci tiCorp does
not want to draw attention to its weighting.

Nevertheless, the district court noted the weight

given each could be calculated. PacitiCorp's cost approach was given 19 percent weight, while
the income approach \vas given 81 percent. (Memorandum of Findings of Fact and Conclusions
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of law, September 16, 2010, p. 16.)

Note that 19 percent is slightly less than Mr. Eyre's

weighting even though he considered all three indicators of value while PacifiCorp considered
only two.

(6)
The appraisal uses "obsolescence in the air"
to reduce the cost approach to the income
approach rather than develop a cost approach that
stands on its own
PacifiCorp impemlissibly uses the assumption of obsolescence to reduce the cost
approach to the income approach.

It does this by using the same "investor required rate of

return" it used to develop the income approach. Stripped of its gloss, the basic argument is: (1)
the cost approach yields a value significantly higher than the income approach, (2) the reason for
the discrepancy must be obsolescence, therefore (3) use the percentage difference between the
assumed actual rate of return and the assumed "investor required rate of return" to detemline the
assumed obsolescence.

Now the income approach and cost approach agree. The reasoning is

circular and has the result of gutting the cost approach to value by relying on a critical income
approach factor to calculate the cost approach. The Oregon Tax Court and Oregon Supreme
Court recognized this.
In United Telephone Co. v. Dept (?lRevenlle, 770 P.2d 43 (S. Ct. Or. 1989), the Oregon
courts

t~lced

the same conceptually deficient analysis PacifiCorp uses in this case. In that case,

both the state's appraiser and Dr. Davis, the taxpayer's appraiser started, as here, with HClD.
Dr. Davis then subtracted, as Paci tiCorp docs here, a figure for obsolescence. As in this case, the
essential calculation in determining obsolescence was to take the projected earnings of the
company and compare it to claimed required earnings. The difference between the two, when
capitalized, supposedly retlects the amount of obsolescence.
APPEllATE BRIEF - 12

The Oregon courts were not fooled. The Oregon Supreme Court noted that the tax court
rejected Dr. Davis's theory of obsolescence. The "mathematical logic" of Dr. Davis's approach
converts the cost approach to an income approach. "Algebraically, the method cancels all cost in
excess of the value indicated by the income approach as obsolescence."
In theory, each approach [to valuation] views the concept of value from a
different perspective, with the intent of considering all facts and perspectives
relevant in the result in the marketplace. Adjusting one approach to make it rely
on the result in the same indication of value as another approach effectively
eliminates a relevant perspective from consideration.

United Telephone, 770 P. 2d 43 at 51.
In this case, PacifiCorp makes the same mistake. PacifiCorp arrives at its improbably
precise weighting of 81 percent for the income approach and 19 percent for the cost approach
because it comingled the two approaches.

The approaches are not different perspectives on

value; they are the same approach. The methodology reduces the cost approach to the income
approach because it relies, I ike the income approach, on the estimate of the income stream (rate
of retum) and the estimate of the capitalization rate (required rate of retum.) (Eyre, Testimony
of July 14-15,2010, p. 306, lines 6-9.) The cost approach should provide a different perspective
on the estimate of value. In the PacifiCorp appraisal, it does not.

(7)
Obsolescence is not the only explanation for the difference
between the income and cost approaches
PacifiCorp's appraisal assumes that obsolescence is the only thing that can account for a
substantial difference between the income and cost indicators of value.
possibilities.
themselves.

There are other

Skill of the workforce, labor costs, and the level of competition suggest
Bad management can certainly depress a company's expected rate of retum.

Mr. Tegarden's approach does not allow this to be considered. Mr. Tegarden states, "We always
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assume typical management, not extraordinarily good nor extraordinarily bad."

(Tegarden,

Testimony of July 14, 2010, P. 101, lines 10-12.) But if there is bad management and it is
assumed to be average, then assuming the resultant diminution in value to be caused by
obsolescence is a mistake.

It is a mistake PacifiCorp's approach will always make because

PacifiCorp assumes obsolescence is the only possible caLIse of a depressed rate of return.

(8)
PacifiCorp's method of determining
obsolescence is too subjective

PacifiCorp's approach to obsolescence is far too subjective. Want more obsolescence to
drive value down'? Lower your estimate of the expected rate of return. Raise the estimated rate
of return required of investors. Do both. Do anything to increase the difference between the
hypothetical required rate of return and the expected rate of return, and obsolescence
automatically increases. Call whatever manipulation of the data you need to obtain the desired
result "appraisal jUdgment" and that result is justified.
The subjectivity in determining the required rate of return is on display in this case.
PacitiCorp's 9.10 percent is higher than either the Commission's (8.89 percent) or Mr. Eyre's
(8.72 percent). These are significant differences. As Mr. Eyre notes, the difference in the rates
by itself results in a $400 million difference in value between Mr. Tegarden's approach and his
own.

(Eyre, Testimony of July 14-15, p. 306, lines 19-22.)

Another example of excessive

subjectivity is given in Mr. Tegarden's appraisal of PacifiCorp for 2005. rn that appraisal, he
indicated PacitiCorp's ohsolescence

f~lCtor

was 30.56 percent, halfagain as high as his figure for

only three years later. P(leijiCorp v. Department of Revenue, Stab No. CT-2005-3, 2007 WL
2220872 p. 10 (Montana Tax Ap Bd 2007).
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One does not need to challenge Mr. Tegarden's integrity to realize that the approach to
obsolescence he uses is subject to serious distortion and manipulation. It should be rejected.

B.
Complex Appraisals Can be Made More Reliable if
Evidence is Required to Show Causes of Obsolescence, the
Quantity of Obsolescence, and that the Obsolescence
Really Affects the Property in Question
How can the determination of obsolescence be made more reliable? The answer is to
insist on proof of its cause, amount, and that the obsolescence really affects the property.
Several cases follow this approach.
In

Ellrr~Fesh,

fnc. v. Graham County, 187 P.3d 530, 218 Ariz. 382 (Az. C1. App 2007)

the property in question was a greenhouse owned by the largest U.S. supplier of greenhouse
tomatoes.

The county and the taxpayer agreed that it was appropriate to begin the valuation

analysis with replacement cost.

The taxpayer's expert then deducted 40 percent for external

obsolescence on the basis that he observed obsolescence in the properties he used for comparable
sales. The appellate court disallowed this deduction stating:
We hold that, as a matter of law, a taxpayer claiming external obsolescence must
offer probative evidence of the cause of the claimed obsolescence, the quantity of
such obsolescence, and that the asserted cause of the obsolescence actually affects
the subject property.
Elm~Fesh,

187 P.3d 530 at 538.

This view was adopted by the Minnesota Tax Court in American O:},srai Sligar CompallY
l'.

County o/Po/k, 2009 WL 2431376 (Minn. Tax Ct. 20(9), a case interesting for other reasons

as well.

The taxpayer was a sugar beet processor claiming both functional and economic

obsolescence. The court considered these separately, looking at the causes of each. In awarding
a reduction in value for functional obsolescence, the court focused on specific equipment and,
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with respect to plant, inefficient layout, unused space, ceiling height, column size, and pillar
sIzes.

These very specific considerations justifying functional obsolescence contrast with

PacifiCorp's evidence in this case, which is simply that the income shortfall approach captures
both functional and economic obsolescence.
With respect to economic obsolescence, the American O),stal court noted three different
analyses might be considered. One of these was the income shortfall method, which the court
did not employ because the propeliy in question was not rental property.

Instead, the court

focused on an alternative methodology for determining whether economic obsolescence existed.
In this case, despite the fact that PacifiCorp's property is not rental property, the PacifiCorp
appraisal uses the income shortfall method to show obsolescence of both types.
Indiana adopted a

Ellrr~lresh

analysis even before Arizona did. In Waf Mart Stores, Inc.

v. Wayne Tp. Assessor, 825 N.E.2d 485 (Ind. Tax 2005) Wal Mart appealed a decision denying it
a 95 percent obsolescence adjustment based on the fact that the store stood for only thirteen days
before being torn down to make way for a new, improved Wal Mart store. The court stated that
to establish obsolescence, a taxpayer must identify the causes of the alleged obsolescence,
quantify the amount of obsolescence to be applied to its improvements, and connect each of
these considerations to an actual loss in property value. The court denied obsolescence because
Wal Mart maintained the old store was worth only salvage value but offered no support for the
conclusion that salvage value corresponded to a 95 percent obsolescence adjustment.

Callal Square Limited Partllership v. State Board of'Tax Commissioner.'i, 694 N.E. 2d
~O 1

(Ind. Tax 1(98) is a case in which the income sholifall method to determine obsolescence

was upheld. The taxpayer owned an apartment complex. It provided a detailed analysis of the
types of problems giving rise to the income shortfall. These included superadequate construction
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required by the city of Indianapolis, an electrical substation on the site, and the excessively
narrow floor plan of certain units.
Even though the court denied the claim for obsolescence, BASF COlp. Coating & Ink
Divisioll v. Belvidere Tmvn, 23 N.J. Tax 551 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2007) provides an example of the so11

of evidence that should be presented to justify an obsolescence claim.

The claim was for

functional obsolescence. At issue was the value of an individual plant. The appraiser noted that
areas of the plant were idle or non-useable space that did not contribute to the manufacturing
process, but which did cause excess costs for utilities, personnel, and maintenance. In addition,
areas of the facility were hindered by low ceiling heights that precluded the installation of
modern equipment. The appraiser compared the plant to a more modern plant, calculated that the
comparison plant produced a given amount of product with a given floor space devoted to
manufacturing, and then calculated the amount of floor space that should be necessary for the
plant being appraised to produce tbe amount of product it generated. The difference between the
amount of floor space needed and the greater amount actually available was obsolescence.
In contrast to the detail provided in Canal Square and BASF, PacifiCorp asserts two
causes of economic obsolescence of more than 20 percent; regulatory lag and the fact that PUC's
do not allow for the inclusion in rate base of assets financed with deferred income taxes.
(Petitioner Exhibit 20, Tegarden Appraisal, pp. 30 and 33.) If regulatory lag accounts for any
obsolescence at all, it cannot possibly account for much. In 2005, the average regulatory lag in
getting new plant and equipment into rate base was 6.2 months with the expectation that this will
be reduced to 3.3 months. (Respondent's Exhibit 522. p. 2, Confidential Valuation Summary for
PacifiCorp (sealed).] Assume a conservative 20-year life for plant and equipment. A delay of 6
months in getting the asset into rate base means the asset \vill not be earning for only 2.5 percent
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of its anticipated life. A delay of 3.3 months is little more than half that. These figures cannot
possibly translate into obsolescence of better than 20 percent.

As to assets purcbased with

deferred income tax not being included in rate base, one should ask why, if this is a drag on
profits, any company would choose to finance assets using deferred income tax? Assuming,
arguelldo, that this is a legitimate claim for obsolescence, two points arise. First, why should we

assume that PacifiCorp did not already self-report this form of depreciation in its FERC filing?
Obsolescence is, as previously noted, included in the FERC definition of depreciation. Second,
this is an example of something that should be quantified. How much of PacifiCorp's assets are
not included in rate base because they were financed by deferred income taxes? We are not told.
It is only asserted that it must be enough to justify more than 20 percent obsolescence.

PacifiCorp otTers no explanation for any functional obsolescence.

C.

Because Its Appraisal is Defective
PacifiCorp did not Meet Its Burden of Proof
The appraisal PacitiCorp depends upon for its valuation is unreliable. In relying on what
is unreliable, Paci fiCorp has not met its burden of proof.
Idaho Code

~

63-409(2) provides that in an appeal from the Commission's valuation of

operating property, "the burden of proof shall fall upon the party seeking affirmative relief to
establish that the valuation from which the appeal is taken is erroneous." Moreover, the burden
of proof has two parts. The taxpayer must prove the Commission's value is wrong and that its
value is right.

Ahhot v. State Tax Commission, 88 Idaho 200, 398 P. 2d 221 (1965). In Abbot,

the taxpayer was able to show that his property was assessed using an improper methodology.
The opinion does not reflect the taxpayer demonstrating what the value of the property really
was. The Court refused
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relict~

noting that "the fact we have found that the criteria of valuc

admittedly used by the assessor in determining the assessed valuation upon appellant's property
was erroneous, it does not necessarily follow that the value fixed is not its full cash value."

Abbot, 88 Idaho 200 at 208.
In this case, both the demonstration that the Commission's value is incorrect and that
PacifiCorp's suggested value is correct depend upon a deficient cost approach as well as the
failure to consider the prior sale and subsequent additions to plant and equipment. PacifiCorp
has not met its burden of proof.

CONCLUSION
Proof should be offered as to the cause of obsolescence, the amount of obsolescence, and
that the obsolescence actually affects the property. PacifiCorp did not do this. Its cost approach
is therefore flawed.

Because the cost approach is flawed, PacifiCorp's appraisal is flawed.

Because its appraisal is flawed, PacifiCorp did not meet its burden of proof in showing either
that the State Board of Equalization's value is incorrect or that its suggested value is correct.
The Commission respectfully requests this court uphold the value in the State Board of
Equalization's decision.
DATED this _ _ day of September 2011.

CARL E. OLSSON
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
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